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  • A Response to “The Exercise of Discipline and Clergy Exemplarity in the Church of England: The Case of Same-Sex Civil Marriages: A Report of the Faith and Order Commission” (GS Misc 1431)

    Fr Thomas Sharp is a priest theologian based in the South East of England and is also Provincial Secretary of the Society of Catholic Priests

    This was the third report which briefed the House of Bishops before they made their decisions in October about Living in Love and Faith (LLF). It purports to explore theological issues relating to three possible ways by which clergy in a marriage to a person of the same sex might be licensed in the Church of England. It also purports to explore what it means that clergy are called to an exemplary life, and what implications there might be for licensing married people who currently would need a civil partnership in order to be licensed.

    The Report claims to do all this whilst ‘not endeavour[ing] to resolve those differences, either finding for one side or making clear a previously unknown path to consensus’ (§214). It does this by almost entirely sidelining the views and voices of LGBTQIA+ people, presenting a viewpoint significantly informed by North American Evangelicalism as if it were a balanced presentation of Anglican variety. Of the 24 modern theologians engaged with in this report (Gregory Nazianzen and George Herbert are the other two theologians included):

    • 100% are white
    • 96% are white men
    • 83% are straight or in opposite sex marriages
    • 46% are North American
    • 12% are ex-gay / same-sex-attracted identifying evangelicals
    • Only one person, at 4% of the whole, is an affirming gay Anglican with a partner.

    The one affirming gay Anglican contribution cited is from Jeffrey John, in a book which was published in 1993 when I was two years old.

    This report does not meaningfully engage with the theology produced by or read by LGBTQIA+ Anglicans, or people who hold an inclusive theology. Simply directing us to the LLF Resources does not constitute theological engagement (§100). This report is not balanced or representative. It should not have represented itself as being such.

    However, it is lengthy and technical, and gives a very good sense of being comprehensive, even whilst it utterly fails to present or even really take into account the voices of those most affected by its subject matter. This is a shamefully inadequate Report whose omissions (wilful or otherwise) have potential to mislead its readers.

    In order to make this meandering and confusing report more intelligible, my response to it comes under six headings:

    1. Make doctrine a moving target
    2. “Communal regulation”, discipline and toxic theologies of power
    3. Are the clergy a special case?
    4. Leading us to think we are talking about sex whenever marriage is mentioned
    5. Despite divorce, we really do still hold to the traditional doctrine of marriage
    6. Disempower the Bishops

    This is a report which overwhelms by the sheer variety of arguments it includes. Here, I cannot deal with them all, particularly the biblical section and its lack of meaningful engagement with LGBTQIA+ readings of important texts.

     

    1 – Make doctrine a moving target

    The FAOC Report on Doctrine defined doctrine as: ‘true knowledge about God that is communally authorised by warrant in the Holy Scriptures and is, therefore, communally regulative’ (GS Misc 1429, §146). However, in this report, that simple definition varies. Early on, ‘authorised by warrant in the Holy scriptures’ is watered down and communal regulation does not appear: ‘Doctrine… is true knowledge about the living God, grounded in or agreeable to the Holy Scriptures, that the Church of England determines by a process of communal authorisation’ (§8).

    Later, elements of both are mixed as doctrine is ‘true knowledge about the living God that is communally authorised and communally regulative’ (§84 & §212). But the scriptures seem to have vanished. On one level this might be a symptom of speedy or sloppy drafting. However, on another, it could be understood as an attempt to give an impression of a clear definition of what doctrine is and how it operates in these arguments, without being willing to be pinned down to any actually clear definition. This sort of slipperiness and unclarity of meaning runs throughout the report.

     

     2 – “Communal regulation”, discipline and toxic theologies of power

    A theological high point comes in §§12-17, when the heresy of Donatism is dealt with and it is concluded that individuals and the wider church can have confidence in the sacramental ministry of a minister, even if they err in doctrine. However, as the report proceeds to outline a theology of discipline, it is unnervingly one-way, authoritarian and entirely lacking in awareness of the operative theologies of power which have led to both the abuse crisis in the worldwide Church and the failure of the Church of England itself to respond meaningfully to abuse.

    The report links discipline with discipleship, and it is established with reference to The Homilies that ‘it is imperative to think of discipline in both its proactive, formative sense and also its reformative and punitive senses in order to understand it fully’ (§17). This is good, but the formative is not really considered. It is the reformative and punitive senses of discipline with which this report is interested, i.e. what sledge-hammers the bishops can hit us with, whether it be for our benefit or to teach us a lesson.

    A survey then follows of reformative discipline as described in the liturgies of ordination of deacons, priests and bishops in Common Worship and the BCP. It entirely lacks any meaningful awareness of the fact that the power to discipline can be incredibly dangerous, despite the liturgy enjoining the bishop to use their authority: ‘not to destruction, but to salvation; not to hurt, but to help’ (§24). The vocation of a bishop ‘to minister discipline, but with compassion’ leads to a reminder that even a compassionate bishop may also need to punish: ‘it may be that such a response is the compassionate one’ (§27). But there is no awareness in the report that hurt and destruction, i.e. abuse, may result from such episcopal behaviour.

    The rather odd concept of “communal regulation”, which I explored (and we were all no doubt confused by) in the liturgical context with reference to the report on Doctrine, reappears. Apparently, the vow made by bishops to ‘accept the discipline of this Church, exercising authority with justice, courtesy and love’ (§29) is when a bishop puts themselves under “communal regulation”. What is entirely overlooked is the significance of justice, courtesy and love in the exercise of that ministry by any individual bishop, or the College or House of Bishops as a whole.

    The same blinkered focus is apparent in the report’s reading of the latter part of the consecration prayer:

    Further on the Archbishop prays, ‘Give him humility, that he may use his authority to heal, not to hurt; to build up, not to destroy’, a reference to 2 Cor 10:8 and 13:10. The emphasis, like in the rephrased declaration, is on the corrective and reformative aspects of discipline.

    It takes deliberate one-track thinking to fail to spot the critique of punitive authoritarian power in this prayer. Punitive authority is the focus of this report. That seems to be what “communal regulation” actually means.

    This disturbing theology of power in the report comes out strongly when clergy families are considered. Canon C26’s injunction to the minister to order their life and their family’s lives in a manner ‘that provides a wholesome example and pattern to the community’ (§36) is presented uncritically. Though the duty to order our family members’ lives is ameliorated since the phrase ‘as much as in him lies’ is interpreted to remind us of ‘the limitations of any individual to determine the behaviour of other family members in all times and places’ (§37). But it is crystal clear that “communal regulation” should be exercised in the home as well, mostly I imagine over wives and children, but over clergy husbands and extended family as well. This is not a theology of power which a responsible theologian simply states uncritically.

    There is a hint that this dangerous and toxic theology of power might be applicable in wider discipleship (“heavy discipling” is one euphemism for spiritual abuse and grooming, after all). The report notes, again uncritically, the linguistic or etymological links between spiritual discipline, church discipline and discipleship: ‘The complementary relationship between spiritual discipline and church discipline would indicate the broad range between the proactive, formative and the condemnatory, punitive ideas that inhere in the single word discipline’ (§43). Tellingly, throughout this passage, the role of the ‘authority figure’ as the exerciser of discipline in its various forms is emphasised.

    Finally, the image of a doctor prescribing medicine from Gregory Nazianzen’s second Oration is used to support this broader deployment of discipline (§46). This is particularly unfortunate and ironic. Gregory wrote his second Oration shortly after his ordination, having fled his post because he did not think he was able to bear the weight of the pastoral duty imposed upon him. He writes in a manner which emphasises the importance and weightiness of pastoral care, almost to an absurd extent. This is an apologia for his belief that he should not be entrusted with such authority to discipline. It is not a suggestion that every bishop and priest should start prescribing punitive medicine.

    This isn’t a funny theological blooper. Rather, it reveals just how far the compilers of the report were not aware of the issues of power underlying the texts with which they engage. Bishops might well read Selina Stone’s A Heavy Yoke: Theology, Power and Abuse in the Church (London: SCM Press, 2025) before they decide that this is the sort of power in relation to God’s people which they want to define themselves as having. If they do, they need to deploy it in all areas of their episcopal ministry and equally on all people in the church, not just LGBTQIA+ people. Gregory, given the choice, ran away from it.

     

    3 – Are the Clergy a Special Case?

    In order to answer this question, the report presents a bewildering array of arguments, many of which are specious or based in unreality. I shall try here to present this torrent of uncompleted ideas in a way which is moderately digestible.

    First, the report argues that ‘The broadest possible jurisdiction one can conceive for church discipline includes baptised Christians on an electoral roll in the Church of England’ (§48). You might think we were about to get a sense of how “communal regulation” applies in the community of the baptised. But this is passed over, moving on to a discussion of Lay Ministers (§49). It seems simply to be accepted that discipline is not something which touches the baptised who are not licensed. This is unsatisfactory and inconsistent with the theology of discipline presented thus far.

    This gap in the argument means that the next argument, that clergy are held to a ‘higher moral bar’ than the laity (§50), seems to arise solely by virtue of ordination. No argument is offered to justify the statement that due to the ‘exceptional nature of holy orders’ the church ‘expects a public transparency about many aspects of life, including areas in which lay Christians are afforded the ease of privacy’ (§50). This is an unreasoned distinction from the privacy afforded to the laity which is presented as self-evident. And should then the bishop, as even more exceptional than the priest, be required for example to publish their bank statements on the diocesan website? There is no theological substance here.

    A strange argument is presented about the call for clergy ‘to witness by example against the norms of the culture in which they sojourn’ (§53). It is not stated directly, but we are used to this sort of homophobic gaslighting, which argues that we are not to be in ‘normative alignment with the shifting sands of cultural values’ (§52), those shifting values being a fictional secular society which is a nirvana of inclusion for LGBTQIA+ people. That secular inclusive society against which the church is called to witness is fiction and a foil. Society is deeply homophobic, even as it is deeply misogynistic and racist still. Homophobia in the Church is in lockstep with the homophobic abuse and discrimination we experience in the secular world every day. It’s not countercultural, it isn’t cool, and it isn’t a witness.

    The distinctive witness of clergy to procure the good conduct of children and their spouses is considered again in the context of this cultural witness. This is passed off masterfully with the sentence: ‘Modern assumptions about the alignment of private, domestic space with public order differ significantly from the assumptions in [the pastoral epistles]’ (§59). It is odd that the report should accept women’s lib and contemporary appreciation of children’s dignity and autonomy so easily after all the handwringing about being counter-cultural. If applied to LGBTQIA+ people, it is simply not clear why the same counter-cultural discipline would not be applicable to women, children and those in clergy households, and no arguments are made.

    The report advances an argument that the vocation to ordained ministry is a ‘whole-life dedication’ which makes it ‘difficult, if not impossible, to separate the moral from the exemplary imperative in a life conceived as a form of witness’ (§64). This is an extraordinary argument for an Anglican to advance, especially as it is essentially the root of the argument for clerical celibacy in the Roman Catholic Church. If ordination is ‘whole-life dedication’ to God, then heterosexual marriage and dedication to another person also should be inappropriate for the clergy.

    Then the report argues that we must take particular account of the perceptions of outsiders.

    The pastoral epistles… even specify that the exemplar ‘must be well thought of by outsiders’ (1 Timothy 3:7). It behoves us to consider the same in the 21st century just as it was commended in the 1st century. In practice, it is inescapable.

    This is blunt application. And it is hard to see why this argument for not ordaining or licensing those in same-sex marriages would not also hold for women, immigrants, disabled people and people who are racialised. Their ordination, as they will tell you, also prompts push-back and elicits ableist, racist and misogynistic abuse and even scandal. And yet again there is no considered argument in the report about why this problem of perception should only apply to LGBTQIA+ people.

    There then is yet another strange argument: that allowing clergy to marry their same-sex partner would ‘alter the context in which Christian exemplary witness is offered and point to the fragmentation within wider society of a consensus on the nature of marriage and sexual intimacy.’ This is simply delusional. There is no fragmentation in secular society on the issue of sexual intimacy. Rather, there is general agreement in secular society that the place of sexual intimacy is no longer anything to do with marriage. Indeed, for even the majority of conservatives in the Church (at the level of operative theology rather than theory) the question is really about what sexual intimacies you enjoy before marriage and which ones you save for your spouse. Again, cultural witness is set up as a straw man, in which resistance to LGBTQIA+ people is supposedly the keystone holding up the Church’s moral witness.

     

    4 – Leading us to think we are talking about sex whenever marriage is mentioned

    In §68 the report acknowledges that clergy households where a couple are in a civil partnership can be exemplary, but it is not clear why those in a same-sex marriage would not be. And in §70 the report acknowledges that things are hard for Christian couples in civil partnerships, but there is no sense that the writers of the report are aware of how the Church’s approach following the 2005 pastoral statement also impacts the broader Christian family gathered around the couple.

    At the heart of the problem here is that the report refuses to say plainly that a same-sex marriage has no more presumption of sexual activity than a civil partnership. The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 inserts s.12(1-2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which disapplies the requirement that same-sex couples consummate their union in order to have a valid marriage. In law, there is no expectation that a gay couple who are married will be having sex, any more than there is for a civil partnership.

    The failure to acknowledge this amidst all the handwringing is one of the largest and most uncomfortable omissions of this discussion of “clergy exemplarity”. The readers of the report are left with the false impression that marriages mean gay sex while civil partnerships mean gay celibacy. This is a false impression. If clergy can be exemplary as civil partners, living a sexually sacrificial life for the Church, there is no reason why they could not also do the same as a married couple. There is no difference in terms of sexual activity between civil partnership and same-sex marriage.

    Indeed, the report stresses that ‘none of what follows intends to draw into question the current provision’ for clergy in civil partnerships. ‘It is nonetheless notable that if a pastoral accommodation is agreed [to enable the same clergy to get married] this may mean that provision [of episcopal guidance] for same-sex civil marriages and same-sex civil partnerships are different from one another’ (§93). However, given that neither involve sex, it is not at all obvious why this should be the case. Yet again, a spectre of something completely new and different is created without specifying any real difference, theological or otherwise.

     

    5 – Despite divorce, we really do still hold to the traditional doctrine of marriage

    The report twists logic to the point of breaking in order to advance two arguments: (i) that the bending of the doctrine of marriage which took place in order to enable the marriage of divorcees with a spouse still living is not analogous to any bending of doctrine required to enable same-sex couples in a civil marriage to be licensed; and (ii) that in any case, despite permitting the marriage of divorcees, we do actually still hold to the traditional doctrine of marriage, that it is between a man and a woman for life. Fair warning: your head will hurt trying to follow this meandering thread.

    We are told that same-sex marriage is in no way the same kind of thing as the marriage of divorcees. ‘While there are clearly similarities between the two, an argument that they are identical does not seem sustainable. Therefore, the logic used to support adding Canon C 4.5 [enabling the licensing of clergy in a second marriage] cannot be a precedent’ (§96). But no reason is given for this judgment that the two are not identical. Indeed, both marriages are a statement of the traditional doctrine, except for one thing: either the gender of the parties, or the “one man and one woman for life” bit.

    Perhaps an analogy could be constructed instead. We are told that ‘Theological reflection should always begin with scripture’ (§99), a statement which will come as a surprise to anyone versed in theological reflection as practiced in Church of England theological colleges. After this we are told that:

    It is true that Holy Scripture does not include explicit precedent for a faithful, stable, permanent same-sex relationship. Similarly, one might observe that ‘Scripture’s teaching on homosexuality is sparse and ambiguous and it is highly questionable to what extent we can derive from it any application to the ethical issue of gay relationships as it faces us today. (§99)

    This is not an argument routinely advanced by LGBTQIA+ people today, who find precedent for our relationships and identities throughout scripture. But the report entirely ignores our love for and valuing of scripture, referencing a group of mostly American straight Evangelicals talking about LGBTQIA+ people (and also referencing Jeffrey John). Unlike divorce, which does exist in scripture, LGBTQIA+ people’s lives and relationships are portrayed in the report as absent from scripture, so without precedent, so without theological existence.

    The report then charts the progress, from the Lichfield Report (1978) to the early 2000s, of the idea that a marriage can end such that a person can marry someone else. This includes: (i) the rejection of sacramental understandings of marriage and (ii) doctrinal clarifications (or developments) that marriage’s being for life was not an essential part of a marriage’s nature, only an ideal (§§111-118).

    We supposedly have arrived at a relatively straightforward conclusion: there cannot be ‘a complete analogy’ (§118) with the marriage of divorcees. However, the argument continues, now in the context of divorce and in what sense clerics’ lives are meant to be exemplary.

    The report notes (referring to St Paul and St Augustine) that marriage was itself a pastoral accommodation in the first place to the ideal of celibacy. It suggests that, when considering making pastoral provision for same-sex couples in marriages, ‘one might contend that such an approach has parallels – though inexact ones’ (§120) with the Pauline and Augustinian accommodation of marriage. However, again, it is not clear why these parallels would not be exact. A thing is not the ideal for sexual ethics, but we make accommodation for it. Why the distinction?

    The section §§122-128 duplicates the arguments of §§52-60, sometimes verbatim, about culture and exemplarity. Again, this feels like an attempt to create an illusion of a coherent argument by repeating material rather than referencing it. On the other hand, it could simply be a drafting oversight.

    The argument seems to be that the pastoral epistles are contextual and culturally referential. They represent an attempt to work out what conduct should be required of the clergy in their own day, in order to be an example of godly life (§124). And so, scripture requires us to consider what holy life looks like today.

    Insofar as the Church of England aims to support and assist those who enter holy orders with the long work of forming and fashion their lives for a visible, grounded holiness, it can only deal in the on-the-ground realities of living as an ordained person in the contemporary culture in which they sojourn. This approach follows the scriptural lead: Paul’s example in the Holy Scriptures indicates it is impossible to think about the exemplary call without considering the context in which Christian witness occurs. (§126)

    A rare, positive conclusion is reached: that it might be possible to think about exemplarity in a way which refers to shifts in understandings of what being exemplary might mean, and in a way which is also biblical.

    Therefore, the argument that clergy in a same-sex marriage may be exemplary invokes cultural context – not in any way omitting theological rigour in preference for an appeal to contemporary culture, but as a move necessitated by Holy Scripture. (§127)

    However, the argument quickly moves off again in another direction, this time truly mind-boggling. The authors of the report wish to underline that the ‘call to celibacy’ may lead ‘same-sex attracted persons’ to opt for a ‘covenanted friendship[] or celibate civil partnership’. By analogy, we are reminded that ‘similar options have always been available to anyone who is divorced with a living spouse’ (§133).  Some choose to remain celibate after a divorce ‘since their remarriage would be a stumbling block to those holding to indissolubility for marriage’ (§133). An argument is being made that because some divorced people decide to remain celibate, that is an option open to LGBTQIA+ people too.

    The report then asks why many opt instead for further marriage. ‘There are surely a number of reasons – but it is hard to escape the conclusion that one reason will be because the church teaches sexual intimacy belongs within marriage and they wish to respect that’ (§134). This is frankly bizarre. On one level it is hard to believe that anyone has ever seriously made this argument. People who are divorced remarry because they want to remarry. The serial monogamist is not making a prophetic declaration that the place for sexual intimacy (with each of their sexual partners) is within marriage. This is utterly bizarre. However, this is advanced as an example of an argument in which an analogy might be possible for extending marriage to same-sex couples who are having sex, in order to affirm the church’s teaching that the place for sex is within marriage.

    However, this argument is so preposterous that it is hard to believe that it would ever be made by anyone who actually wanted to convince the reader that same sex marriage might be a good thing. The analogy with divorce makes it absurd. If the report was seriously offering a positive argument for marriage equality, it would simply argue that the place for sex should be within lifelong marriage. And that would be an argument that many LGBTQIA+ people do actually make.

    That positive argument is finally made, almost in passing, along with an equally easily missed reference to the possibility that same-sex couples who are married might not necessarily actually be having sex:

    While it is true that a same-sex marriage – which one cannot be certain is sexually active, but for those who want to affirm same-sex relationships offers a faithful, stable, and permanent context for sexual intimacy – does present challenges to the church’s teaching on sexual intimacy, which restricts it to heterosexual marriage, there is a case that a same-sex marriage offers a model that is exemplary in our society. (§138)

    But you could have been forgiven for missing those significant points as they flew past.

     

    6 – Disempower the Bishops

    In my response to GS Misc 1430 on marriage, I noted the high emotional tone of some of the language, which seemed aimed at making the episcopal readers less inclined to exercise their episcopal prerogative. We have seen how this report might well have the same effect, but by mystifying the reader in a barrage of confusingly arrayed arguments.

    However, the sections considering the possibility that the bishops might permit clergy, who currently need to be in civil partnerships in order to receive a license, to simply get married, and that they might just decide not discipline them, do sow fear. They do this by foretelling legal uncertainty and legal challenge in a manner that suggests the bishops would be taking a course of action which could be described as courageous.

    The ideal, surely, for all of us, is that we might come to one mind, with sufficient majorities to pass legislation which pleases everyone. However, if this is not possible, the report acknowledges that it is possible ‘for the diocesan bishops to exercise their discretion in responding to a situation that raises such questions about doctrine and practice being in tension’ (§82). This is a very odd way to frame episcopal discretion which arises from the tortured logic of ‘communally regulative understanding of doctrine’ (§84) which is rehearsed again. Far more sensible would have been a simple statement of the long-established episcopal discretion which exists for a bishop to administer their diocese as they see fit. A survey of the legal and historical as well as ecclesiological grounding for this would have been particularly interesting. But I suspect it would have shattered the illusion of a church held together by its ‘communally regulative understanding of doctrine’.

    The report notes that the House of Bishops could decide to relax discipline across the Church of England. ‘This would constitute a form of communal regulation – but only of one constituent house of the General Synod’ (§190). The argument is framed to evaluate every option for episcopal action through the lens of the ‘communally regulative understanding of doctrine’. Since that concept presumes that only maximum agreement can be acceptably communally regulative, this essentially paralyses the bishop from acting in their diocese.

    It is a masterful, if strangled, conceptual power grab. So the House of Bishops as a whole cannot act because they are only one house of Synod (§190). The bishop in their diocese cannot act because this ‘would also put the approach in tension with the idea that discipline operates on a communally [sic] regulative manner’ (§192).

    Indeed, with the concept of ‘communally regulative understanding of doctrine’, the bishop is rendered powerless, and the bishops as a House are disempowered utterly. They are responsible for discipline. But they cannot exercise their prerogative when it comes to discipline. Which begs the question, what is the point of a bishop? It is a line of reasoning which only works if you remain committed to the ‘communally regulative understanding of doctrine’ and wilfully ignore 2000 years of ecclesiological theology on the role of the bishop in their diocese.

    But, lest the bishops assert their prerogative, we are told that individual bishops inhabiting their role ‘carries the greatest risk for discipline to depart from doctrine, potentially resulting in legal challenges and increased confusion over such matters’ (§197). This argument is repeated in §213 as the last paragraph of the report, just to make sure the bishops were left with a dose of panic. Peter Collier KC has taken the teeth out of this legal threat pretty convincingly. Like many of the arguments advanced in this report, it is not real.

    The bishops should not be afraid to lead, to minister and to administer. Conservative bishops have done so, interpreting doctrine more tightly in some areas and more loosely in others as fits their own beliefs about what it means to be a shepherd of Christ’s flock in their diocese. Inclusive bishops should be similarly empowered. And the House of Bishops as a whole should not let its freedom to act be utterly dissolved into communal regulation. The bishops are not merely an upper rubber-stamping chamber for the secretariat and the Synod as a whole. For this reason, above all the others, this report must not become enshrined in Church of England thinking. What it risks is a functional Presbyterianism, a synodality which is not Anglican, and a House of Bishops who are ordained and consecrated to be shepherds of Christ’s flock, but who find themselves powerless to do anything meaningful in fulfilment of that calling.

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

  • Where Does the House of Bishops Currently Stand on the Use of Prayers of Love and Faith? Some Reflections

    by Peter Collier KC, retired Senior Circuit Judge and former Vicar-General of the Province of York

     

    On 15 November 2023, General Synod passed a motion on Living in Love and Faith which acknowledged that we are in a period of uncertainty but, among other requests, asked “the House to consider whether some standalone services for same-sex couples could be made available for use, possibly on a trial basis, on the timescale envisaged by the motion passed by the Synod in February 2023”.

    Such a trial period would result in an expectation that if, at the end of it, there was a wish to continue the use of the Prayers, then that would be put through a Canon B2 process.

    After much longer than people had hoped for, the House of Bishops has now reached a provisional decision, which they anticipate confirming in December. That decision is that, following advice from the Church of England’s Legal Office and from the Faith and Order Commission (FAOC), such services – now described as ‘bespoke services’ – “would require maximum communal authorisation through the Canon B2 process of approval”.

    The recent legal advice (dated September 2025) which has now been published does not differ materially from what previous documents told us was the essence of the legal advice received on earlier dates. Annex F to GS 2328 had said that authorisation through Canon B2 would provide an automatic defence to any legal case brought against clergy for using the prayers. The advice at that time was that, provided the House, exercising its legally and theologically informed judgement, formed the view that the proposed prayers and other material met the requirements as to doctrine that are set out in Canon B5, then they could properly be commended. That was and presumably still is the case, as the use of the prayers in regularly scheduled services remains commended for use under Canon B5.

    The role of context

    What is of course new is the advice from FAOC. In short, it addresses the issue of the extent to which context and symbolic action communicate what the church believes. FAOC says that when used publicly, and especially when used in bespoke or occasional services, the Prayers may be seen to communicate an ecclesial endorsement of a couple’s relationship as a whole, including its sexual dimension. It says, some would say argues(!), that in public rituals meaning is read as much from what is seen as from what is said. Also, that actions, gestures, and vesture generate strong signals for a variety of audiences looking on. It says that, while explanatory prefaces may help, people will remember the enactment more than the caveat. In conclusion, FAOC suggest that symbolic actions, such as an exchange of rings, will communicate more than the church’s doctrine of marriage will allow.

    Notwithstanding that all of that also applies to such symbolic activity in regularly scheduled services – which are to be allowed to continue – the House has provisionally concluded that performance of the same symbolic activity in a standalone service should not take place until authorised by Synod through a B2 process.

    The Church of England and civil weddings

    Of course this is not the first time that the Church of England has addressed questions around marriage services. In 1836, the Marriage Act challenged the practice of all weddings being conducted only through the Church of England, and introduced what we now call ‘civil weddings’. Weddings conducted in registered buildings other than churches, in the presence of a registrar and two witnesses, were lawful. This was the first time that Parliament provided for people to marry other than through the rites and ceremonies of the Church of England.

    The Church was not happy and, in the debate on the bill in the House of Lords, the then-Bishop of Exeter, Henry Phillpotts, said that it was “a disgrace to British legislation. [It] is pretended to be called for to prevent clandestine marriages, but I think it will greatly facilitate such proceedings. Not solemnized by the church of England, may be celebrated without entering into a consecrated building, may be contracted by anybody, and will be equally valid, whether it takes place in the house of God, or in the house of a registering clerk, one of the lowest functionaries of the state. The parties may take one another for better and for worse, without calling God to witness their plighted troth. No blessing sought; no solemn vows of mutual fidelity; no religious solemnity whatever …”. Clearly in his mind this fell far short of ‘Holy Matrimony’ as per the Book of Common Prayer.

    Various other developments culminated with the use of a religious service in a register office being prohibited by s.12 of the Marriage and Registration Act 1856. So, more by accident than design, we reached the place where there was a very clear distinction between religious and secular marriages.

    Divorce and marriage

    However, a much more fundamental issue arising from the different views about marriage held by state and church was that of remarriage after divorce. In 1857, control over divorce passed from the church courts – which had exercised complete control over marriage and divorce since the Middle Ages – to the newly-created Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. Until then, divorce was rare and expensive, requiring in almost all cases an Act of Parliament to bring it about. The grant of divorces by the courts was slowly liberalised over the years, culminating in 1969 with the “irretrievable breakdown of a marriage” being the sole ground for divorce.

    Throughout this period, the Church of England remained adamant that marriage was for life and that any remarriage during the former partner’s lifetime amounted to adultery. In 1957, the church not only banned the use of the “solemnisation of holy matrimony” for the remarriage of divorcees but also barred the provision of any public service to mark a couple’s civil marriage when one of them was divorced.

    Some clergy, notwithstanding that official position, did hold private services of prayer and dedication for such couples either in their home or, sometimes, in a church. The Lichfield Report (1978) reviewed the position, along with the pros and cons of holding a service of prayer and dedication for those who had gone through such further marriages. However, it concluded that there was a risk of confusion between such a service and a marriage service. It argued that, whatever explanations were given, it was likely that some taking part would be unaware of the distinction, particularly if the traditional ceremonial elements such as a bride wearing white, the ringing of bells and the like “would convey a powerful misleading message which the words of the service would be unable to correct”. That argument will sound very familiar to anyone who has read the recent FAOC advice.

    However, within three years of the Lichfield Report being issued, in July 1981, Synod voted overwhelmingly for a motion that “there are circumstances in which a divorced person may be married in church during the lifetime of a former spouse”. But what were those circumstances? Such was the division on this issue across the country, that it was very difficult to find a way forward. At the root of the disagreement was the question as to whether this was a matter touching on the doctrine of marriage. That question remained unresolved when, in 1985, the then House of Bishops commended under Canon B4 a ‘Service of Prayer and Dedication After A Civil Marriage’.  This remains a commended service and is still in use today, particularly by some clergy who feel in all conscience that they are unable to agree to a remarriage in church according to the rites and ceremonies of the Church of England.

    The Church of England and the Civil Partnership Act

    The next occasion when changes in the civil law led to the Church having to address matters that touched on its understanding of marriage was when the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force. How should the Church respond when those who had entered into a Civil Partnership asked for prayers or for a blessing on their new status?

    On the 25 July 2005 the House of Bishops provided a Pastoral Statement on Civil Partnerships that said that clergy should not provide a service of blessing for those who have entered into a civil partnership but, if approached by people, they should “respond pastorally and sensitively in the light of the circumstances of each case”.

    Nigel Seed KC, then the Chancellor of the Diocese of London, prepared an advice in 2008 for the clergy of that diocese about what to do if asked to conduct services of blessing for those in civil partnerships. Having considered parallels with the ‘Service of Prayer and Dedication After A Civil Marriage’, and noting that “interestingly for a service that is not ‘a service of blessing’, it does include a blessing of the two individuals, but not of their union”, he concludes by saying:

    Thus the position is clear. Unless and until one of the relevant authorities listed in Canon B5.2 provides a form of service, beneficed clergy (or other clergy authorised by them) may use a form of service they consider suitable in respect of a civil partnership providing that service does not amount to a ‘service of blessing’ and is reverent and seemly and is not contrary to, nor indicative of any departure from, the doctrine of the Church of England in any essential matter.

    It would seem to be commonplace that such services are now in regular use across the country.

    Pastoral responses to same- sex marriage

    So where does all that leave us now that we are facing another challenge presented to us by Parliamentary intervention into marriage? Once more it fell to the Bishop of Exeter, in this case Michael Langrish, to express the Church’s concern when the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 was making its way through the House of Lords. He said that if the bill was passed:

    A basic understanding of marriage, in law, will have irrevocably changed, and with one reality now bearing two different labels; or we will have legislated into being two very different realities, but confusingly bearing the same name.

    One of the points about a civil partnership is that it is very much not a marriage. A same-sex marriage is also very much not a marriage in the eyes of the church. So, is there any good reason why a pastoral and sensitive response can be made to those who have entered a civil partnership, but not to those who have entered a same-sex marriage?

    The pattern would seem to be well established – we begin with the Service of Prayer and Dedication where the couple but not the union are blessed, we follow that with the pastoral and sensitive prayers for those who have entered a civil partnership which might equally bless them but not their union, and then we come to those who have entered a same-sex relationship where again we pray for and bless them but not their civil union. Although not spelled out in that way, it is my understanding that the many years of work that went into producing the resource section of the Prayers of Love and Faith (PLF) were intended to produce exactly that – a recognition and blessing of the positive goods seen in a relationship, without any acknowledgement of that relationship being anywhere close to what the church currently understands to be a marriage in the sight of God. Such a marriage, when entered into according to the rites and ceremonies of the Church of England, necessarily can only take place between a man and a woman.

    It was that understanding that was set out in GS 2289 when the House stated its intention of commending those resources for use by those who wished to use them, but reserving always the right of any cleric to decline to do so on grounds of doctrinal conscience, as was the case in 1985.

    On the basis of all the above, it is clearly in order for any cleric who wishes to do so, to use the commended PLF resources in any regularly scheduled service. Although the House has in its guidance so far said that they should not be used other than in regularly scheduled services, I find it difficult to understand why that should be the case. I take on board what FAOC has said about symbolism, but note that the same was said in the Lichfield report in 1978, and that all the symbolic matters that concern FAOC may be just as much present in a regularly scheduled service as in a standalone service. And it is to be noted that the Introduction to the Prayers at pages 3 and 4 is very clear about what is and what is not being offered through using these resources.

    It also seems to me that on the same basis that Chancellor Seed considered that, when no other provision had been made but some sort of service was required, then it is within the discretion of the minister to provide a service that is not contrary to or indicative of departure from the doctrine of the Church of England. It is very difficult to see how what is apparently not so indicative in a regular service should become so simply because the service is occasional.

    The threat of legal proceedings?

    Throughout the discussion of these matters, and obviously something that has weighed heavily with the House, is the possibility of legal proceedings being taken against a cleric who uses prayers that have not had full Canon B2 approval. But I question whether the House has really looked at the nature and detail of those potential proceedings and therefore at the reality of the threat they are thought to pose.

    Any complaint would clearly be about doctrine – the whole ground of any such disciplinary complaint would be that what had happened was contrary to the doctrine of the Church. As such it could not proceed under the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003, as section 7(2) of that Measure provides that “proceedings in relation to matters involving doctrine, ritual or ceremonial shall continue to be conducted in accordance with the 1963 Measure”. That is the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (EJM). Its proceedings are complex to say the least. It was their complexity, cost and consequent rare use that led to the passing of the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003.

    First, under the EJM there are restrictions on those who can commence proceedings. Under section 19 proceedings can only be commenced (1) by a person authorised by the Diocesan Bishop to bring a complaint; (2) by six persons aged 18 or over whose names are on the electoral roll of the parish the incumbent or stipendiary curate who they seek to complain about; (3) in the case of the stipendiary curate by their incumbent. I would have thought it unlikely that a cleric whose parishioners were unsupportive is likely to offer such prayers. There is much in the guidance about discussing matters and getting the approval of the PCC for their use. Also, the complainants would have a lengthy and potentially expensive path ahead of them. As for the Bishop bringing a complaint, I think any Bishop would have to think long and hard before launching one, as may become clear as we consider the process.       

    Under section 39, once the complaint has been brought to the Bishop’s attention and they have considered it, they must give the accused and the complainant the opportunity of a private interview. Having held that interview or interviews the Bishop may decide to take no further steps in the matter in which case it comes to an end, or may decide to refer it for inquiry.

    If the bishop has referred the complaint for inquiry, the inquiry is carried out by a Committee of Convocation in accordance with section 42. The committee consists in the case of an accused priest or deacon of (i) one member of the Upper House of the Convocation of the relevant province appointed by the archbishop; (ii) two members of the Lower House of that Convocation appointed by the prolocutor of that House; and (iii) two chancellors of dioceses in that province, appointed by the Dean of the Arches and Auditor. That committee inquires into the complaint to decide whether there is a case to answer in respect of which the accused should be put on trial. Both sides may lay evidence before the committee in affidavits; the committee might also require any deponent to an affidavit to attend and answer questions on oath. The committee decides if there is a case to answer and, if so, they spell out what the offence is.

    But that is not an end of the matter because they go on to consider whether the offence is too trivial to warrant further proceedings; or that it was committed under extenuating circumstances; or that further proceedings would not be in the interests of the Church of England; and in any of those cases they would then dismiss the complaint. Also, they may decide there is no case to answer. Only if they decide there is a case to answer and that they are not dismissing it for any of the reasons set out above can they send it for trial before the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved.      

    This Court consists of five members: two Court of Appeal judges (currently Smales and Lindblom LJJ) and three Diocesan Bishops (currently Chelmsford, Chichester, and Gloucester) They are assisted by between three and five persons selected from of a panel of specialist theologians and liturgists. Proceedings follow the pattern of a criminal trial with the criminal rules of evidence. Any decision is decided by a majority.

    If at the conclusion of the proceedings the accused is found guilty of the offence charged, then they are liable to be censured in accordance with section 49. However, under section 49(3), unless the accused has been admonished on a previous occasion in respect of another offence of the same or substantially the same nature, then no censure more severe than a ‘monition’ can be imposed. A monition is “an order to do or refrain from doing a specified act”, which effectively would amount to an order not to do it again. There is therefore no risk of deprivation inhibition or suspension for a first offence.

    It is all that complexity coupled with the lack of teeth in any outcome for a first offence that causes me to think that it would be very unlikely that any bishop would (a) authorise proceedings in the first place, or (b) want to send to an inquiry any case that had been launched by anybody else. Equally, I think that any Committee of Convocation would be very tempted to use one of their three options to dismiss rather than send the case to a hearing. Given the limited penalty, for a first offence which this would inevitably be, what would be the benefit of going to a hearing? Even if any of the parties or the Bishop thought that this might resolve an important doctrinal issue, there would be no guarantee of the outcome, and so I would guess little appetite to take the risk.

    In all the circumstances, it does seem to me that the threat of litigation is vastly overstated in the papers that have been produced so far.

    So where do we go from here?

    The resource material in the PLF is available as commended material for use when praying with a same sex couple in regularly scheduled services and that position is likely to remain after the House reaches final decisions in December.

    Even if they were to withdraw that commendation, it would be open to any priest relying on Canon B 5.2 to use a form of service considered suitable by them to provide a service of thanksgiving and prayer for a couple who approached them asking for such. It seems to me that it would be very difficult to criticise what would surely be seen as a pastoral and sensitive approach. In the preliminary conversations with the couple, I cannot imagine that the priest would not explain that there were limits to what could be offered because the Church of England for the time being has a doctrine of marriage which does not permit it to do any more, given that they are a same sex couple. I cannot imagine that would be any surprise to the couple, who in agreeing to the service offered, would be acknowledging that they understood that that was the Church’s doctrine.

    I can also see no reason why in any announcements about the service, either in advance or at the time, something could not be said that effectively apologised that no more could be offered whilst the current doctrinal position about same sex marriage remains in place. This would overcome the anxiety of FAOC that simply saying what positively is on offer may lead people to conclude that the Church has a doctrinal position other than it has. I can of course understand that people may not want to say anything that detracts from positive statements in the service itself but it would, so far as I can see, provide a complete answer to that significant concern of FAOC.

    And we can look back to those same concerns being expressed about the remarriage issues in the 1980s and note that there has been no lessening of an understanding of what the Church’s doctrine of marriage says. People still believe that the couple are committing to a life together till death does them part, and not committing to have a go at it for as long as they can, which has always seemed to me to be what lawyers refer to as ‘special pleading’.

    But, assuming that the December position of the House follows on from what was said in October, what of those who are not able to accommodate the prayers into their regular pattern of services? It seems to me that the arguments I have just advanced in relation to relying on Canon B 5.2 apply equally in those circumstances.

    What if a diocesan bishop issues an ad clerum purporting to forbid clergy using those prayers in their diocese? The oath of canonical obedience is to “pay true and canonical obedience to the Lord Bishop … and his successors in all things lawful and honest”. On the face of it there is a strong argument for saying that the priest is properly applying canon law and cannot be forbidden from so doing. Canonical obedience is generally understood as obeying such instructions as are given within the law of the church, and the law expressed in Canon B5 allows a priest to use such forms of service as are considered suitable by them for the occasion.

    But it should be noted that Canon B 5.4 provides that “If any question is raised concerning the observance of the provisions of this Canon it may be referred to the Bishop in order that he may give such pastoral guidance, advice or directions as he may think fit,  but such reference shall be without prejudice to the matter in question being made the subject matter of proceedings under the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963.” The question here is whether an individual diocesan Bishop, in all the circumstances outlined above, is really able to say that the use of such prayers is either contrary to or indicative of a departure from the doctrine of the Church of England in an essential matter. Ultimately of course if such a direction were given and not followed it could be the subject of a complaint under the 1963 Measure, which would proceed as set out above to an outcome which, at the moment, may seem very uncertain for the Bishop.

    Finally, it must follow from all that I have said above that the House needs to give further thought to the matters that I have set out before coming to any final decisions. Careful consideration needs to be given to the long history of the relationship between church and state in relation to the state’s development of marriage and how the church has responded at different times. It needs to be acknowledged that the church has always been concerned that any adaptation of its practices to accommodate what is happening in the outside world may be seen as a threat to its understanding and doctrine of marriage.

    However, accommodations have always been made, and the doctrine has survived. There may be a lot of pressure both inside and outside the church to change the doctrine, but there is no doubt what that doctrine is. They should also not forget that some provinces have already changed their doctrine of marriage, and many other provinces are currently struggling over these issues, even as we are. Historically, the House has led the way in providing sensitive and pastoral accommodation in such changing times.  My question to them is whether they have the courage to do so again?

  • When Will the Bishops Think Properly About Same-Sex Marriage?

    by Revd Canon Neil Patterson, Vice-Dean of Bristol Cathedral and Chair of Together for the Church of England

    Amongst the papers presented to this February’s General Synod by the Bishop of Europe on the 13th February are two which include significant amounts of theological reflection on the Church’s understanding of marriage, presented as contributions to the ongoing work of Living in Love & Faith. The first is contained in the long GSMisc1406 paper on many different doctrinal aspects, including an exhaustive summary of many different texts and documents on marriage; unsurprisingly, these show a certain harmony as they are related to one another, and there is limited acknowledgement of the changing social context of marriage to which they applied, or the way in which the mid-20th century texts emerge from a situation of impassioned but ultimately unsuccessful resistance to the acceptance of divorce and remarriage. More concerning, however, is the shorter GSMisc1407 from the seven members of the Episcopal Reference Group, as this is presented as their provisional advice to the House of Bishops and Synod on the doctrinal questions.

    GSMisc1407 is formed of a presentation of ‘Nine Theses’ about the nature of marriage which are asserted to have been held consistently through Anglican history, followed by reflections on areas where specific theses have shifted or been viewed differently over time. It then concludes with a reflection that the ‘envelope’ of marriage has been seen as more or less expansive, and so inviting the bishops to consider whether the envelope is large enough to include same-sex couples, or whether some particular decision could make it so. Naturally, all of us, bishops or not, are likely to line up fairly predictably on either side of whether or not the envelope is, or should be, large enough, or whether that is not possible.

    I wish to respond rather more precisely to one area of the Nine Theses (though there are others which might well be questioned). This is the assertion about the nature of marriage as seen by the Church and in law which appear under Thesis 2: Marriage is God’s gift in creation (pp.6-8). I will leave Adam & Eve to others – my concern is with the claim of the unity of marriage whether contracted in church or civilly – and the way in which this appears to be either a careless or wilful sidestepping of the questions raised on p.7 of GS2289 (the original LLF paper tabled at Synod in February 2023). The starting point is the assumption, which as far as I am aware no-one is challenging, that opposite-sex couples who are legally married are regarded by the Church as married, whether or not that marriage was contracted in a church or civil setting.

    However, the ERG move on to the question of whether or not this fact was changed by the introduction of same-sex marriage in 2014, to which they respond “it did not, however, change the wording or meaning of the civil rite as used by any given man and woman.” There is no reference provided for this assertion. There cannot be, because it is false. The reality in the law of England (though not the Canons of the Church of England, to be sure) is that the meaning of all marriages, including those contracted in churches, was changed by the 2013 Act. Every opposite-sex couple now marrying in England (or indeed the many other states that recognise same-sex marriage) is entering the same legally married state as all the same-sex couples married there. That civil status has various legal consequences, but the most important for the purposes of doctrine is that it is exclusive – being married to someone of the same sex is just as much an impediment to a further marriage (to someone of either sex) as opposite-sex marriage. As far as I am aware, no-one is claiming that the non-recognition of same-sex marriage by the Church allows same-sex spouses to freely commit bigamy by a church wedding to someone of the opposite sex.

    For some opposite-sex couples, of course, they may not feel this to be so – they may believe (whether out of Christian conviction or otherwise) that marriage is only possible between a man and a woman. But they do not make same-sex couples any less legally married. The situation is closely analogous to those committed to the absolute indissolubility of marriage who do not recognise those married after divorce as truly married – a legitimate viewpoint that makes no difference to the real status of those marriages. However, many couples, including practising members of the Church of England marrying in church, recognise with rejoicing that marriage is now open to same-sex couples, whom they are pleased to regard as equal with them in marriage. That the ERG have dismissed their legally correct understanding with a baseless assertion seems rather more ‘pastorally damaging’ than a distinction between civil and church marriage that no-one has been attempting to make.

    The real problem is that both the theological papers have deliberately set out to answer the wrong question, and so produced an answer that is not helping in the present context. By setting out to survey the history of official Church texts and documents on marriage, they have predictably enough delivered a synthesis of a reasonably coherent tradition, with at least some recognition of change over time. The question that needs to be asked, however, is what the Church believes theologically about same-sex marriage. This is not an abstract question about a hypothetical future, as the reports seem to muse. It is a live and urgent question about the thousands of same-sex married people in England now, including faithful church members, members of General Synod, prospective ordinands, clergy both serving and now excluded from ministry, and even the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Appointments Secretary. And it seems very possible that, following a consultation just begun, the Church in Wales may wish to commence same-sex marriages (a possibility provided for in the 2013 Act) and these may need banns to be called in England if couples live there, making it a very live issue indeed.

    It seems to me there are three possible responses that might be considered at the present time, and this at least gives me a chance to return to a more Anglican approach by commending the middle way:

    1. Same-sex marriage is equal in every way to marriage (the secular legal position) and so should be regarded as theologically true also, with same-sex marriages regarded as holy (sacramental, if that is your language) even if contracted civilly. Though I recognise that this will be the personal view of some same-sex spouses in the Church of England, and is the position for which Together in the Church of England would argue in the long term, it seems clear to me that given the present form of the Marriage service and the text of Canon B.30, it is not the current position of the Church of England.
    2. Same-sex marriage is an aberration, because the use of the word ‘marriage’ and the surrounding cultural assumptions make it clear that it exists to formalise same-sex sexual relationships, which are contrary to the teaching of Scripture. The logical response is to systematically warn such couples of their sin, and seek to exclude them from all positions of responsibility. Some in the Church articulate this view clearly, but the Bishops’ Pastoral Guidance of 2014 provided that same-sex married couples should be welcomed, a welcome now more clearly manifested by the authorisation of the Prayers of Love & Faith as a means to celebrate the love of same-sex couples.
    3. The Church does not recognise same-sex marriage as Holy Matrimony (as defined in Canon B.30) but does regard it as a good thing, and following the guidance on the PLF, takes no specific position on sexual activity in such marriages (noting that by definition it will not be the ‘sexual intercourse’ of a man and a woman traditionally recognised as the consummation of an opposite-sex marriage). This follows the distinction suggested in GS2289, though not fully explored there (and against the argument of GSMisc1407) to offer a possible way to accept and celebrate those in same-sex marriages, including clergy, whilst the discussion on theology of same-sex relationships continues.